This thesis examines the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) coalition from its beginning to its end. Following initial Japanese advances and victories in December 1941 and January 1942, Allied forces formed the ABDA coalition as one of the first methods to respond to the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) area. ABDA's existence was painful and short-lived, culminating in its demise as Japanese forces gained area military air and naval superiority and invaded Java in March 1942. Differing objectives and priorities by allied components influenced the ability of ABDA to fight effectively. Additional factors were poor Command and Control (C2) of tactical forces composed of different nations. Four major naval surface engagements and multiple land and air engagements did not stop the NEI from falling in March 1942. ABDA's political, military, and tactical dynamics merit further study for implications for future multinational operations in which the United States may be involved. The purpose of the research will be to answer the following three questions: Why did ABDA not work, what could have made ABDA succeed, and what implications can be learned for modern military forces fighting in the coalition arena.