Many scholars have struggled with Irigaray¿s focus on sexuate difference, in particular with her claim that it is ¿ontological, ¿ wondering if this implies a problematically naïve or essentialist account of sexuate difference. As a result, the ethical vision which Irigaray elaborates has not been taken up in a robust way in the fields of philosophy, feminism, or psychoanalysis.
By tracing the notion of relation throughout Irigaray¿s work, this book identifies a rigorous philosophical continuity between the three self-identified ¿phases¿ in Irigaray¿s thought (despite some critics¿ concerns that there is a discontinuity between these phases) and clarifies the relational ontology that underlies Irigaray¿s conceptualization of sexuate difference ¿ one that always already implies an ethical project.
The text demonstrates that an understanding of Irigaray¿s Heideggerian inheritance ¿ especially prominent in her later texts ¿ is essential to grasping the sense of the idea that sexuate difference is ontological ¿ it concerns Being, rather than beings. This book further develops potential applications of this ontological notion of a ¿relational limit¿ for the fields of philosophy, feminism, and psychotherapy.