This study examines the relationship of current U.S. Field Artillery Doctrine to the concept of maneuver warfare. The impetus for the work is the generally poor results of fire support at the National Training Center (NTC). The purpose is to determine what, if anything, is wrong with FA doctrine. The analysis begins with an examination of the Relative Combat Power Model which relates the combat elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. This model is the backdrop for the remainder of the study which looks at the Army's experience at the NTC, the Arab-Israeli wars of the last twenty years, and evolving artillery doctrine. The study concludes that the maneuver and fire support communities are at odds over the adequacy of artillery doctrine due to a shared misconception of the relationship between maneuver, firepower, and protection. Each fails to recognize that the elements of combat power are, at times, at odds with each other. This relationship requires that the leader synchronize all warfighting assets in a combined arms approach. Until all parties accept this notion, the Army runs the risk of basing doctrinal changes on a faulty premise.