In this accessible book, Richard Double, presents a vigorous defence of metaethical subjectivism, arguing that the acceptance of this doctrine need have no deleterious effects upon theorizing either in normative ethics or in moral practice. Proceeding from a 'worldview' methodology Double criticizes the rival doctrine of metaethical objectivism for lacking both 'completeness' and 'soundness' , argues that a defence of metaethical subjectivism requires no special semantic analysis of moral language and defends the plausibility of metaethical subjectivism as explaining key intractable disagreements in moral philosophy.
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ISBN | 9780754654179 |
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Sprache | eng |
Cover | Fester Einband |
Verlag | Taylor and Francis |
Jahr | 20051228 |
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