This paper focuses on relationships between maneuver and counterair operations at the operational level of war. It seeks to determine key elements of air threat protection doctrine in support of operational maneuver. Its methodology first examines theory behind maneuver and protection as elements of combat power before using the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1982 Falklands War as historical examples which show recent wartime relationships between maneuver and counterair force protection. A look at current doctrine then establishes a baseline for comparison with key points from the theoretical and historical analyses. Results of this comparison provide observations concerning U.S. doctrine and the needed interface between theater maneuver and counterair operations. Insights concerning the air threat, dominance of the air, jointness and synchronization to include its components indicate that some changes may be needed in U.S. doctrine for maneuver and counterair operations during campaign planning and execution. Pertinent lessons in these areas appear to be learned and relearned but not remembered. Implications of these lessons learned may be serious for NATO where the air and counterair threats are much more serious than in the Falkland and MidEast theaters of war.