This study provides an analysis of the environment and enemy which the American infantry confronted during the Korean Conflict. These elements are analyzed with respect to their effect on a potential modern conflict involving light infantry against a light enemy in rugged terrain. Specific recommendations are provided o overcoming the dominant effects of the terrain on firepower mobility protection and "human wave" assaults are presented. Finally, a light infantry defensive model is provided incorporating defensive considerations for brigade and smaller units. Among the many conclusions drawn from this study are: light infantry remains a viable force in Korea against the current threat, the light infantry units do not possess the capability to perform a covering force mission, especially during periods of limited visibility and so techniques such as the combat outpost line should be reviewed for adaptability. Organizational conclusions include: the light infantry is organizationally fragile and must receive priority fill, weapon systems for this force must facilitate cross-training even at the expense of technology, weapon systems must be improved for the battle under 300 meters, units down to the lowest level should be organized with the assets with which they must fight. Tactical conclusions include: increase live fire training, provide the light infantry with reliable ground sensors to assist in countering infiltration, give the light infantry scout a motorcycle for increased mobility, every light infantry soldier must be capable of performing as an infantryman, tactical reserves must be far enough forward and numerous to provide a responsive counterstroke in the event of enemy assault. The study concludes that the lessons learned during the Korean Conflict remain valid today and should be incorporated into the doctrinal organizational and tactical structuring of the light infantry divisions.